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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1970s and 80s, a spirit of aggressive celebration permeated the study 
of legal pluralism. The romantic assumption that nonstate law was more 
egalitarian and less coercive than state law subtended terms like “people’s law” 
and “folk law,” and became enshrined in the names of organizations like the 
Netherlands-based Folk Law Circle (Volksrechtskring) and the International 
Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences’ International 
Commission of Folk Law and Legal Pluralism.1 Legal pluralism was more than a 
methodological stance intended to help lawyers and anthropologists talk to 
each other. It was an ideological commitment.2 
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 1. For use of the term “people’s law,” see Antony Allott & Gordon R. Woodman, Introduction to 
PEOPLE’S LAW AND STATE LAW: THE BELLAGIO PAPERS 1, 2 (Antony Allott & Gordon R. 
Woodman eds., 1985); Upendra Baxi, Discipline, Repression and Legal Pluralism, in LEGAL 
PLURALISM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANBERRA LAW WORKSHOP VII 51 (Peter Sack & Elizabeth 
Minchin eds., 1986). 
On the many meetings of the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism (est. 1978), see 
INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE (Bradford W. Morse & Gordon R. Woodman eds., 1988); 
PEOPLE’S LAW AND STATE LAW: THE BELLAGIO PAPERS, supra, at 355; From the Editor, 23 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. v (1985); Carol J. Greenhouse & Fons Strijbosch, Legal Pluralism in 
Industrialized Societies: Introduction, 33 J. PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1993); IUAES Commission 
on Contemporary Folk Law, 18 AFR. L. STUD. 62 (1980). 
The Dutch “Folk Law Circle” (Volksrechtskring) was established in 1976. On the use of the term 
“folk law” in the Dutch academic context, see John Griffiths, Recent Anthropology of Law in the 
Netherlands and its Historical Background, in ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 11, 
11–66 (Keebet von Benda-Beckmann & Fons Strijbosch eds., 1986); G. C. J. J. van den Bergh, The 
Concept of Folk Law in Historical Context: A Brief Outline, in ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW IN THE 
NETHERLANDS, supra, at 67–89. 
 2. See P.G. Sack, Legal Pluralism: Introductory Comments, in LEGAL PLURALISM: PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE CANBERRA LAW WORKSHOP VII, supra note 1, at 1. 
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Marc Galanter was one of the few to hold back. In his 1981 piece, Justice in 
Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, he warned against 
glorifying nonstate law: 
[I]ndigenous law . . . is not always the expression of harmonious egalitarianism. 
[Indigenous law] often reflects narrow and parochial concerns; it is often based on 
relations of domination; protections that are available in public forums may be 
absent.3 
Justice in Many Rooms is anomalous in many ways, combining as it does legal 
pluralism and access to justice, two themes that make little contact in the rest of 
the scholarship on legal pluralism. This retrospective takes Justice in Many 
Rooms as one of a group of pieces produced during the 1980s that 
fundamentally shifted the conceptual bases for the study of legal pluralism. 
Focusing on the pluralist side of the piece, the article traces a thread in a 
subsequent related literature that has given life to Galanter’s 1981 reservations 
about the tone of the early legal-pluralist movement.4 
Scholars have cooled to the view that writing about legal pluralism implies 
an ideological endorsement of nonstate law. The shift is particularly clear in 
discussions over the reasonable limits of tolerance in a multicultural society. 
The cultural defense debate should be read not just as a centerpiece of the 
multiculturalism discussion, but also as an integral part of the legal-pluralist 
literature—despite its rather surprising failure to make this link explicit.5 
 
 3. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. 
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 25 (1981). 
 4. This article refers to the English-speaking movement specifically. Francophone work on 
“ethnologie juridique” and legal pluralism predates the Anglophone wave of interest. See Gordon R. 
Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate About Legal Pluralism, 42 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21, 23–26 (1998) (summarizing John Gilissen’s and Jacques 
Vanderliden’s attempts to define legal pluralism in 1971). See generally John Gilissen, Introduction à 
l’étude comparée du pluralisme juridique, in LE PLURALISME JURIDIQUE: ÉTUDES PUBLIÉES SOUS LA 
DIRECTION DE JOHN GILISSEN 7–18 (John Gilissen ed., 1971); Jacques Vanderlinden, Le pluralisme 
juridique: essai de synthèse, in LE PLURALISME JURIDIQUE, supra, at 19–56; Jacques Vanderlinden, 
Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, 28 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 149 (1989) 
(reflecting on the state of legal pluralism almost twenty years after his first paper on the subject, Le 
pluralisme juridique: essai de synthèse, supra). 
 5. For leading contributions to the multiculturalism debate among political theorists, see generally 
IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7–26 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (containing the title 
article by Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturlism Bad for Women?, which examines multiculturalism 
from a feminist perspective, and other articles responding to Okin); WILL KYMLICKA, FINDING OUR 
WAY: RETHINKING ETHNOCULTURAL RELATIONS IN CANADA (1999); WILL KYMLICKA, 
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 1 (1989) (“[P]resent[ing] the liberal accounts of community 
and culture . . . to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, and to link them to the more familiar liberal 
views on individual rights and state neutrality.”); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A 
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 1–2 (1995) (“[I]dentifying some key concepts and principles 
[of multiculturalism] . . . and . . . clarify[ing] the basic building blocks for a liberal approach to minority 
rights.”); BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY (2d ed. 2006) (discussing multiculturalism from a political-theory perspective); 
THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY (Michael Walzer et al. eds., 1982) (containing essays discussing pluralism 
with regard to voting, leadership, and dual and divided loyalties); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF 
PEOPLES: WITH, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED (1999) (proposing a model of a “Society of 
Peoples” that would include liberal peoples, along with nonliberal but “decent” peoples); CHARLES 
TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (1994) (discussing 
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II 
REMEMBERING THE 80S 
In the 1980s, scholars like Marc Galanter, John Griffiths, Sally Engle Merry, 
Franz von Benda Beckmann, Upendra Baxi, Boaventura De Sousa Santos, and 
others inaugurated the legal-pluralist sequel to the “what-is-law” debate 
between legal positivists and natural-law advocates. Challenging legal-centralist 
assumptions about the state’s monopoly on law, they pushed for an expansive 
use of the term, arguing that law referred equally to a multiplicity of nonstate, 
normative orders—from the rules governing schools to trade associations to the 
family.6 Many terms and models have been proposed.7 The most widely adopted 
 
recognition of different ethnic and cultural communities in constitutional democracies); MICHAEL 
WALZER, ON TOLERATION (1997) (discussing different aspects of toleration and reflecting on 
multiculturalism in the United States); Amy Gutmann, The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political 
Ethics, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 171 (1993) (developing the concept of “deliberate universalism” to 
counter the cultural-relativism critique of legal pluralism); Will Kymlicka, Liberal Theories of 
Multiculturalism, in RIGHTS, CULTURE AND THE LAW: THEMES FROM THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 229 (Lukas H. Meyer et al. eds., 2003) (describing the debate among 
political theorists over multiculturalism in western liberal democracies, and Joseph Raz’s contribution 
to the debate); Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in RECHT IN EEN 
MULTICULTURELE SAMENLEVING 127 (N.J.H. Huls & H.D. Stout eds., 1993) [hereinafter Liberal 
Perspective] (arguing against “conservative nostalgia” for the preservation of “pure exotic cultures”). 
 6. See generally MASAJI CHIBA, LEGAL PLURALISM: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY THROUGH 
JAPANESE LEGAL CULTURE (1989) (using social-scientific principles to examine legal pluralism in 
Japan’s nonwestern legal culture); Upendra Baxi, Discipline, Repression and Legal Pluralism, in 
LEGAL PLURALISM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANBERRA LAW WORKSHOP VII, supra note 1 at 51; 
Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 
14 J. L. & SOC’Y 279, 297–98 (1987) (characterizing legal pluralism and the concept of interlegality as 
key components in a postmodern conception of law); Galanter, supra note 3, at 1–2 (“The view that the 
justice to which we seek access is a product that is produced—or at least distributed—exclusively by the 
state . . . is deficient.”); John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 1 (“[T]his article . . . seeks to establish a descriptive conception of legal pluralism . . . 
[which is] the presence in a social field of more than one legal order.”); Sally Engle Merry, Legal 
Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 872 (1988) [hereinafter Merry, Legal Pluralism] (“This review 
discusses primarily the social science version of legal pluralism.”); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, 
Comment on Merry, 22 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 897 (1988) (critiquing Merry’s review, Legal Pluralism, 
supra); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 38 (2002) (“[T]he discussions [on legal pluralism] are too strongly fixated on the 
law-state link and give too little attention to other aspects of the definition of law that are equally 
important.”). 
 7. For examples, see generally LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN 
LAW (Hanne Peterson & Henrik Zahle eds., 1995) (on “legal polycentricity”); M. Chiba, The Identity 
Postulate of Indigenous Law and its Function in Legal Transplantation, in LEGAL PLURALISM: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANBERRA LAW WORKSHOP VII, supra note 1, at 33 (on “indigenous law”). 
The term “legal polycentricity” has not consistently been distinguished from legal pluralism. 
Compare Lars D. Eriksson et al., Introduction: A Polytical Manifesto, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: 
CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAW, supra, at 8 (arguing that “legal polycentricity” differs from 
“legal pluralism” because it approaches law from within the discipline of law, rather than from the 
“outside” perspective of social science) with Henrik Zahle, The Polycentricity of the Law or the 
Importance of Legal Pluralism for Legal Dogmatics, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF 
PLURALISM IN LAW, supra, at 189 (using “legal polycentricity” and “legal pluralism” synonymously). 
For examples of other proposed terms, see also De Sousa Santos, supra note 6 (on “interlegality”); 
Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and Societies, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 115 (1984) (on “integral plurality”); 
Galanter, supra note 3, at 17–27 (on “indigenous ordering”); Stewart Macaulay, Private Government,  
in LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 445 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (on “private 
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is Sally Falk Moore’s notion of the “semi-autonomous field,” a normative order 
defined by “the fact that it can generate rules and customs and symbols 
internally,” but “is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces 
emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded.”8 
The work of Galanter and his colleagues brought about two major changes 
in the conception of legal pluralism. The first was the shift from the 
understanding of legal pluralism as a plurality of norms administered by the 
state—the model embodied by Hooker’s classic study—to an understanding of 
a plurality existing beyond the state.9 The second was an attempt to get beyond 
Hooker in a geographical sense. What Sally Merry calls the “new legal 
pluralism” was born out of the shift from seeing legal pluralism as a colonial or 
post-colonial phenomenon in the nonwestern world, to one that exists equally 
in industrialized, largely western contexts.10 
III 
THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 
Since the 1980s, excellent work on legal pluralism has been done by scholars 
who do not explicitly so identify their subject. The best instance of this 
“unofficial” work on unofficial law is the debate over the cultural defense. The 
defense has potential applications across civil and criminal domains.11 However, 
the literature has focused upon its feasibility as a partial defense to murder. 
 
government”); Walter O. Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the 
‘Gypsies,’ in GYPSY LAW: ROMANI LEGAL TRADITIONS AND CULTURE 11 (Walter O. Weyrauch ed., 
2001) (on the “autonomous lawmaking” of the Romani people). 
 8. Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: the Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719, 720 (1973); see also SALLY FALK MOORE, 
LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 54 (1978); WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE 
LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 104–08 (2006). 
 9. See M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-
COLONIAL LAWS 1 (1975); Anne Griffiths, Legal Pluralism, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
SOCIAL THEORY 289, 290–98 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2002). 
 10. See Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 6, at 872. See also Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism in 
Mind: A Non-Western View, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAW, 
supra note 7, at 74; John Griffiths, Legal Pluralism and the Theory of Legislation—With Special 
Reference to the Regulation of Euthanasia, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF 
PLURALISM IN LAW, supra note 7, at 201; see generally 33 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 
(1993) (containing articles about legal pluralism in industrialized societies). 
 11. For civil and criminal contexts falling short of murder, see ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE 
CULTURAL DEFENSE 48–182 (2004) [hereinafter RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE] (addressing 
minority cultural elements of criminal and civil cases pertaining to homicide, children, drugs, animals, 
marriage, attire, and the dead). For a lesser criminal context, see Mother ‘Cut Boys’ Faces in Tribal 
Ritual’, THE TIMES, July 16, 1974, at 3 (detailing the case of R. v. Adesanya, in which a mother 
performed Nigerian ritual scarification upon her two sons in the United Kingdom and attempted to 
argue for a cultural defense); Discharge for Mother in Tribal Cuts Case, THE TIMES, July 17, 1974, at 4 
(describing how the judge in R. v. Adesanya found the Nigerian mother guilty of assault, but ordered an 
absolute discharge on the grounds that the mother did not realize she was breaking the law). See also 
RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE, supra, at 49–51 (discussing the R. v. Adesanya case); Alison 
Dundes Renteln, Is the Cultural Defense Detrimental to the Health of Children?, in LAW & 
ANTHROPOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK FOR LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY VOL. 7 29–31 (Rene 
Kuppé & Richard Potz eds., 1994) [hereinafter Is the Cultural Defense Detrimental?]. 
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Should an individual convicted of murder have his or her sentence reduced 
(typically from a mandatory life sentence to a discretionary sentence) if it can 
be proven that he or she was reacting to a culturally specific act of provocation? 
The triggering act would not be considered inflammatory to the same degree, if 
at all, according to the norms of the host society. 
Across the common-law and western world, an array of cultural norms and 
scenarios have produced opportunities to employ this defense.12 The classic 
examples entail violence against women. In an Australian case, a Turkish 
immigrant father murdered his teenaged daughter for engaging in premarital 
sex, claiming that her behavior constituted provocation to a person of his 
cultural and religious background.13 In a well-known American case, a Hmong 
man accused of kidnapping and raping an underaged woman of his community 
in California, argued that he had carried out the Laotian tradition of “marriage 
by capture” (zij poj niam).14 In another case, a Chinese man living in New York 
smashed his wife’s skull with a claw hammer upon discovering that she had 
been unfaithful, claiming that a wife’s adultery is particularly shameful in 
Chinese culture.15 
The defense has been attempted by women, too. A conservative Lebanese 
woman living in Australia killed a male relative when he made sexual advances, 
claiming that her response was appropriate by her own cultural norms.16 A 
Japanese woman living in California drowned her two children and attempted 
to kill herself upon learning of her husband’s extramarital affair. She argued 
that she had attempted to perform Japanese ritual parent-child suicide (oya-ko 
shinju), a tradition whose existence was confirmed by a petition signed by 
25,000 members of the Los Angeles Japanese community.17 Several aboriginal 
 
 12. For an extensive list of case references (mainly American), see RENTELN, THE CULTURAL 
DEFENSE, supra note 11, at 321–29. For a similar list covering English, Australian, and Indian 
authorities, see Stanley Yeo, UNRESTRAINED KILLINGS AND THE LAW: PROVOCATION AND 
EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENSE IN INDIA, ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA xiii–xix (1998). 
 13. R. v. Dincer (1983) 1 V.R. 460. 
 14. People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1985). See generally RENTELN, THE 
CULTURAL DEFENSE, supra note 11, at 126–28; Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice 
Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105–07 (1996); Neal A. 
Gordon, Implications of Memetics for the Cultural Defense, 50 DUKE L.J. 1809, 1830 (2001); Nancy S. 
Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A Framework for Analysis, 27 
N.M. L. REV. 101, 123–24 (1997); Choua Ly, Conflict Between Law and Culture: The Case of the Hmong 
in America, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 471, 478–81, 484–86 (2001); Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad 
for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 5, at 18; Nilda Rimonte, A 
Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community 
and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1319–20 (1991). 
 15. People v. Dong Lou Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988). See Daina C. Chiu, 
Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1053 
(1994); Alice J. Gallin, The Cultural Defense: Undermining the Policies Against Domestic Violence, 35 
B.C. L. REV. 723, 729–31 (1994); Kim, supra note 14, at 102; Rimonte, supra note 14, at 1311; Leti 
Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 
57, 64–77 (1994). 
 16. See R. v. Saliba, 10 CRIM. L.J. 420 (1986) (summarizing the case from New South Wales). 
 17. People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (L.A. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985). See also  Kim, supra note 14, 
at 117–19. See generally Taimie L. Bryant, Oya-Ko Shinju: Death at the Center of the Heart, 8 UCLA 
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Australian women killed a white Australian man in a drunken brawl after he 
called one a “black bitch” and another a “slut.” They told the court that by 
aboriginal norms, their violence was the correct response to his insults.18 
Courts have generally been reluctant to endorse the defense.19 But academic 
discussants like Renteln, Yeo, and others have been more receptive.20 Against 
them is the claim that the cultural defense is impracticable: cultural practices 
are so time-bound, region-specific, class-based, malleable, and at times 
contested, as to be effectively unidentifiable and certainly unenforceable.21 
Joseph Raz has made the alternative argument that there is nothing inherently 
sacred about culture, even when it is determinable.22 The point is particularly 
relevant, given a phenomenon often manifested by immigrant groups: the 
intensification of perceived traditional values in comparison to current social 
views not only in the host society, but also in the society of origin.23 
The subculture problem is another serious challenge to the cultural 
defense—or else a reason to extend its ambit.24 If special exceptions are made 
for other cultures in our midst, why not for home-grown subcultures as well? If 
the teenaged “Goth” has a choice in choosing his or her subculture, is it fair to 
say that the second-generation Wahhabi Muslim exercises no agency in 
choosing which elements of minority and majority culture to adopt, even if he 
 
PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1990); Yuko Kawanishi, Japanese Mother-Child Suicide: The Psychological and 
Sociological Implications of the Kimura Case, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 32 (1990). On a case with 
similar facts, see Kim, supra note 14, at 127. 
 18. See Diane Bell, Exercising Discretion: Sentencing and Customary Law in the Northern 
Territory, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 1, at 367–68. For another aboriginal case 
involving the cultural defense, see Regina. v. Muddarubba, in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, Ethnicity and 
the Objective Test in Provocation, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 67, 69 (1987) (discussing the 1957 Australian 
case). See also James Crawford, Peter Hennessy & Mary Fisher, Aboriginal Customary Laws: Proposals 
for Recognition, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 1, at 50. 
 19. On the U.S. context, see RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE, supra note 11, at 186. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission recommended enabling the partial defense through legislation, a 
suggestion that was not implemented. See Aus. L. Reform Comm’n, ALRC 31—The Recognition of 
Aboriginal Customary Laws, 1986, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/ 
31/pdf_index.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2008) (follow “ALRC 31 Vol. 1” and “ALRC 31 Vol. 2” 
hyperlinks). 
 20. See RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE, supra note 11, at 188; LEON SHELEFF, THE FUTURE 
OF TRADITION: CUSTOMARY LAW, COMMON LAW AND LEGAL PLURALISM 262–89 (2000); Malek-
Mithra Sheybani, Cultural Defense: One Person’s Culture is Another’s Crime, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 751 (1986–87); Yeo, supra note 18, at 68; Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986). But see PRAKASH SHAH, LEGAL PLURALISM IN CONFLICT: COPING 
WITH CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN LAW 20, 67–87 (2005) (offering a more radical, conflict-of-laws 
approach). 
 21. See Coleman, supra note 14, at 1162; Kim, supra note 14, at 115; Ly, supra note 14, at 489–94. 
But see RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE, supra note 11, at 207–10 (arguing that despite limits to 
how the cultural defense may be used, it is still viable, and its application requires a “case-by-case 
approach”). 
 22. See Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, supra note 5, at 139–40. 
 23. A reified sense of tradition is one component of what has been called “Patelism” in the U.K. 
context. Anu Garg, Patelism, A Strategy, And Indian Doctors’ Well-Being, Presentation at the 2007 
British Association of South Asian Studies Annual Conference at Cambridge (Mar. 30, 2007). 
 24. See William I. Torry, Multicultural Jurisprudence and the Culture Defense, 44 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 127–61 (1999) (advocating an extension of the cultural defense). 
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or she opts for religious associations that represent a marginal subculture 
themselves?25 As Shah has argued, the cultural defense assumes that only some 
ethnic minorities possess cultures, while “white (and black) people do not.”26 
The most powerful critique of the cultural defense is the feminist one. A 
group of American feminist scholars, many of whom identify themselves as 
female lawyers of East and Southeast Asian descent, argue that the cultural 
defense decriminalizes violence against minority women, whom they argue are 
the most common victims in these cases.27 In “the ultimate trap for a woman of 
color,” the cultural defense casts gender power against racial (or more 
accurately, cultural) solidarity.28 Where the courts have been sympathetic to the 
cultural defense, many Asian American communities have understood 
themselves to be operating in a law-free space in which violence against women 
will be tolerated. Women from these communities are less likely to seek the 
protection of the law. Many feel the state has abandoned them, albeit out of a 
liberal sense of cultural sensitivity.29 Echoing elements of the larger discussion 
amongst political theorists, writers like Rimonte, Volpp, Kim, Choi, Gallin, and 
Chiu have argued that multiculturalism (in this particular form) is indeed bad 
for women.30 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Since the 1980s, it has been generally accepted that legal-pluralist 
scholarship has left the colonial childhood home for good.31 In fact, there have 
been frequent visits back. This multicultural turn has meant that work on 
nonstate, nonethnic norms in western contexts has been drowned out by the 
deluge of work on immigrant and indigenous people’s normative orders, 
themselves replete with post-colonial resonances.32 Galanter and his colleagues 
 
 25. The American case law on religious minorities (which deals largely with minorities of vaguely 
protestant, European background) could provide insights on the subculture problem. See Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh-Day Adventists); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (the 
Amish). On cases involving Christian Scientists, see Renteln, Is the Cultural Defense Detrimental?, 
supra note 11, at 48–53, 64–67. 
 26. SHAH, supra note 20, at 86.. 
 27. For critiques of the cultural defense, see generally Chiu, supra note 15; Carolyn Choi, 
Application of a Cultural Defense in Criminal Proceedings, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 80 (1990); 
Coleman, supra note 14, 1162–65; Gallin, supra note 15, at 745; Kim, supra note 14; Rimonte, supra 
note 14. 
 28. See Chiu, supra note 15, at 1121. See also Coleman, supra note 14; Anne Phillips, When Culture 
Means Gender: Issues of Cultural Defense in the English Courts, 66 MOD. L. REV. 510 (2003). 
 29. See Gallin, supra note 15, at 735–36. 
 30. See Choi, supra note 27, at 89; Chiu, supra note 15, at 1121–24; Gallin, supra note 15, at 735; 
Kim, supra note 14, at 131; Rimonte, supra note 14, at 1319; Volpp, supra note 15, at 75. See generally 
PAREKH, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 5. 
 31. See Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 6, at 872. 
 32. For a sample of the avalanche of work on ethnic minority norms, see 51 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 
& UNOFFICIAL L. (2005) (containing articles on “multicultural interlegality”); Michael Humphrey, 
Community Disputes, Violence and Dispute Processing in a Lebanese Muslim Immigrant Community, 
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writing in the 1980s may not have predicted the reemergence of these colonial 
associations. But Galanter did warn against the tendency to celebrate nonstate 
law as inherently less objectionable than state law—a view made repeatedly in 
the discussion of ethnic minority norms, particularly from a feminist 
perspective. Through the quest for a workable model of tolerance in a 
multicultural society, what has emerged since 1981 is a less polemical and 
politically invested approach to legal pluralism. 
Work on the cultural defense has exposed binaries that complicate the 
earlier division between left-leaning pluralists and legal centralists, adding the 
feminist-versus-pluralist opposition into the mix. This antagonistic constellation 
deserves more attention than it has received, not just from scholars of legal 
pluralism, but also from those writing on ethnic minorities and law, a field that 
is particularly well developed in the United Kingdom.33 At very least, 
discussants of legal pluralism and the cultural defense need to see themselves as 
connected. Critics of the cultural defense have made an important intervention 
in the legal-pluralist literature, giving muscle to Galanter’s discomfort with the 
tone of the early legal-pluralist movement. Why neither side has acknowledged 
it remains a mystery. 
22 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 53 (1984); Fons Strijbosch, Ancestors in the Law of 
Moluccans in the Netherlands, 33 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 53 (1993); Fons Strijbosch, 
Self-Redress and Feud: Among Moluccans in the Netherlands, 32 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL 
L. 47 (1992). See also GYPSY LAW, supra note 7. Even recent work on commercial “cultures” like the 
diamond trade often has an ethnic component. See Oliver Mendelsohn, How Indian is Indian Law?, in 
ENCULTURING LAW: NEW AGENDAS FOR LEGAL PEDAGOGY (Mathew John & Sitharamam 
Kakarala eds., 2007) 146–48 (on the Jain diamond merchants of Palanpur, India); Barak D. Richman, 
How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006) (addressing orthodox Jewish diamond traders in New York). To 
compare with works discussing trade cultures’ norms, see Galanter, supra note 3, at n.34. 
 33. For examples of works on ethnic minorities and law, see SEBASTIAN POULTER, ENGLISH LAW 
AND ETHNIC MINORITY CUSTOMS (1986); DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 
51–83 (1998) (examining Muslim law in Britain); Werner Menski, Law, Religion and South Asians in 
Diaspora, in RELIGIOUS RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH ASIAN DIASPORAS: FROM ONE 
GENERATION TO ANOTHER (John R. Hinnells ed., 2007)  243–64; SHAH, supra note 20. 
